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Abstract 
The French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926-1984) is one of the most influential 
thinkers of the twentieth century. This paper situates his work in the context of recent 
media debates on postmodernism and gives an account of his work, life and times and the 
critical reception of his work. Particular reference is made to his controversial discussions 
on truth and power. 
 
 
I 
I would like to thank Gerard Henderson for the invitation to speak at the Sydney Institute. 
This paper will deal with the famous French philosopher Michel Foucault and debates 
centred around his career and works. [1] Foucault, who lived from 1926 to 1984, is one 
of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century. His ideas have been used 
extensively across the entire range of the humanities and the social sciences and in 
professional disciplines such as education, health and management studies. His work 
tends to attract dramatically polarized responses – Foucault has been both idolised and 
bitterly condemned. I would like to look at some of the dynamics of that reception as well 
as what is about his persona and work which generates such strong opinions and 
reactions. Foucault’s name often crops up in popular discussions around postmodernity –
this in spite of the fact that he made no claims himself to belong to this movement of 
thought – on the contrary in fact. In view of this perceived connection however, I would 
like to begin with a few comments on the recent debate in the public media over 
postmodernism and its apparently pernicious effects on what is currently being taught in 
schools and on literacy in general. Even the Prime Minister, John Howard, has weighed 
in on these discussions with widely reported remarks on the negative impact of so-called 
postmodernism on the teaching of both English and history in schools. It is not entirely 
 2
clear what the contributors to these debates actually mean by ‘postmodernism’, but 
generally speaking the word seems to designate an approach which combines 
impenetrable jargon with political correctness, an unwarranted attention to the products 
of popular culture and a heedless disregard for such things as objective truth and facts.  
The argument runs that school students are being taught slabs of 
incomprehensible ‘theory’ derived from French and German philosophers (Foucault’s 
name often figures prominently) and force fed a diet of ‘political correctness’ at the 
expense of basic skills such as knowing how to spell and punctuate and also at the 
expense of the acquisition of basic ‘facts’ about culture, history and historical 
chronology. Furthermore, it is argued that the great eternal canon of Dead White 
European Males which every school child should memorise is being replaced by an 
undue emphasis on the disposable ephemera of popular culture. In an interview broadcast 
on the ABC on the 20th April 2006, John Howard announced that he was in agreement 
with, to quote him, ‘the views of many people about the so-called postmodernism’. He 
went on to add: ‘we …understand there’s high quality literature and there’s rubbish, and 
we need a curriculum that encourages an understanding of high quality literature and not 
the rubbish’. [2] 
Understandably, these remarks have generated a lot of attention and debate in the media 
and in educational circles and have added fuel to the fire of a long standing campaign in 
The Australian against the evils of postmodernity and programs of ‘critical literacy’ in 
schools. There are, of course, a number of manifest contradictions and confusions in this 
debate as others have pointed out. On the one hand, there is the argument that high-level 
theory which is difficult even at postgraduate university level is being taught in schools. 
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This paradoxically co-exists with the argument that school students are being taught the 
trashiest of popular culture and that as a result, in Howard’s terms, we are seeing a 
‘dumbing-down’ of the English syllabus.  There is no doubt that there are serious 
problems which have been generated by the garbled uptake of poorly understood ideas, 
but this is not sufficient argument to throw the baby out with the bathwater. 
One particularly extreme contribution to this debate was offered by Giles Auty in the 
The Australian on the 21st April, the day after Howard’s radio interview. [3] Auty begins 
by conflating Marxism and postmodernism – two world views which are generally 
recognized as quite divergent, and blames them for ‘the present, covertly politicized and 
academically disastrous model’ of education. According to Auty the embodiment of these 
two ideologies, and ‘the posthumous arbiter of the way our children and university 
students are taught’ is none other than Michel Foucault who in Auty’s account emerges 
as something akin to the Osama Bin Laden of the intellectual world, exercising his 
baleful influence over the literacy skills and political views of ‘hundreds of thousands of 
children now attending Australian schools’. Leaving aside Auty’s lurid account of 
Foucault’s alleged personal habits, this opinion piece is worth mentioning in so far as it 
rehearses a well-worn and familiar script of accusations against Foucault which usually 
run as follows: 
1. First of all, Foucault doesn’t believe in objective truth or things like facts and 
subscribes to an extreme postmodern position that anything goes. In short, if you 
believe it, then it’s true. Furthermore there is no truth only power. What people 
take to be true is in fact merely the product of struggles for power. 
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2. Secondly, Foucault was an amoral nihilist, an anarchist who was only interested 
in dismantling and destroying existing systems of order and then proposing 
nothing in their place – generating general despair, apathy and political nihilism 
amongst those foolish enough to read his work. 
3. Thirdly, he and others such as Jacques Derrida (founder of deconstructionism), 
Jean-Francois Lyotard (author of The Postmodern Condition) and Jean 
Baudrillard  (famous for his notions that modern culture represents nothing but 
itself), are responsible for creating an impenetrable wall of jargon which has had a 
woeful effect on clear English expression and prose in a number of academic 
disciplines. This ‘wooden tongue’, as the colourful French expression describes 
the vocabularies of ideologies, has trickled down to afflict the English and history 
curricula of schools. 
4. Lastly and by no means least, Foucault’s personal morality was highly dubious. 
He is represented as a self-destructive homosexual who died of AIDS and who 
may, it is whispered, even have gone out and deliberately infected other people 
with the disease. This behaviour of course completely negates any value that his 
work might otherwise have had. 
Inflated rhetoric indeed, and all too commonplace within certain media both in Australia 
and abroad. More balanced or sympathetic accounts usually only emerge in academic 
journals and books with a restricted circulation, or in the specialist media aimed at an 
educated or academic public, such as The Book Show and The Philosopher’s Zone on 
ABC Radio National. Thus, unfortunately, the general public continues to receive 
uninformed and often deliberately misleading accounts of the ideas in question, with no 
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alternatives offered to balance the ledger. The most recent public incidence of this kind of 
rhetoric in relation to Foucault’s work can be seen on the Wikipedia page on Foucault 
which was in August 2006 the subject of a fierce no holds barred editing war. Wikipedia 
is, of course, the handy internet font of all knowledge for many in a hurry. This recent 
edit war, which is fully documented on the discussion page relating to the Foucault entry, 
has resulted in the permanent banning of two contributors and the suspension of another. 
All four positions mentioned above were given more than ample airing in this battle. 
 
II 
After this long preamble, what I would like to do here is weigh in here with a positive 
assessment of the impact of Foucault’s work. I would like to place particular emphasis on 
the various political and historical events which serve as a context to his work as these 
are are often glossed over, indeed completely ignored, when his name is dropped willy 
nilly into various moralizing tirades about the current decadent state of Western 
civilisation. 
Foucault was born in the French provinces into a comfortable middle class 
professional family in 1926. His father was a surgeon who expected his son to follow in 
the family profession. In 1946 he entered the prestigious Ecole Normal Supérieure in 
Paris. This institution which was founded in 1845 was originally a teacher training 
college but developed into a very elite institution which has over the years produced a 
number of France’s top intellectuals, scientists, politicians as well as Nobel Prize 
winners. Louis Pasteur, Jean- Paul Sartre and Georges Pompidou all number amongst its 
alumni. Foucault like every other self-respecting young radical student at the time joined 
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the local communist party cell at the Ecole in 1950. His decision to join was influenced 
by events in the war in Indo-China but his tenure was less than enthusiastic - he seldom 
turned up to meetings and left in 1953 when a number of Jewish doctors were arrested in 
the USSR for alleged treason. Interestingly, Foucault’s uncompromising rejection of anti-
semitism also emerged later in his career. After a serious terrorist attack on a well-known 
Jewish restaurant in Paris in 1982 which left several dead and many wounded, Foucault 
would eat there as often as possible as a gesture of protest against terrorism. But let’s 
return to the political and intellectual climate at the end of World War II in France. Right 
wing ideologies which had advocated adherence to homeland, traditional family values, 
respect for authority and the army were severely discredited in the aftermath of the 
German occupation, and the actions of the puppet Vichy Government led by aging World 
War I war hero Marshall Pétain. The void left by the collapse of right wing political 
philosophies was initially filled by a variety of left wing, Marxist, Catholic and atheist 
versions of existentialism. The Communist Party which made much of its (somewhat 
late) contribution to the Resistance also acquired a glorious and illustrious cachet in the 
public eye as a result. Remnants of right wing philosophies nonetheless survived notably 
in the form of Gaullism. All these various movements were grouped under the broad 
umbrella of ‘humanism’. The main assumption of this philosophy was that something 
called ‘human nature’ determined how people lived and acted in the world. Human 
nature, depending on your point of view, was either God–given or a natural biological 
template which remained constant throughout history and which could be gradually 
uncovered and defined via the efforts of both the physical and human sciences, or, if one 
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was of a literary and philosophical bent, through a process of artistic and philosophical 
introspection. 
At the end of the 1950s, however, a number of events in France and abroad such 
as the Khruschev report which condemned Stalinism, the Algerian war and the 
Communist suppression of the Hungarian Revolution produced massive political 
disillusion in the ranks of intellectuals. As a result, a number of them turned away from 
overtly political material to examine ‘scientific’ areas which appeared to be more 
ideologically neutral and also of more immediate concern. These young intellectuals 
rejected what they saw as the politically compromised and out of touch humanist 
approach. One of the members of this new movement was Foucault who notes in relation 
to this period: ‘The experience of war had shown us the urgent need of a society radically 
different from the one in which we were living, this society that had permitted Nazism 
that had lain down in front of it… A large sector of French youth had a reaction of total 
disgust toward all that’. [4] This new movement was dubbed ‘structuralism’ by the press.  
Generally speaking structuralism rejected the idea that there was such a thing as a 
universal human nature which was able to explain all of history and existence. 
Structuralists argued that meaning was determined by the relation between things – it was 
not located in the things themselves. Rather than trying to discover what a human being 
truly was in his/her essence, structuralists were more interested in looking at the 
structures underlying knowledge, culture, society and language. So, for example, literary 
critic Roland Barthes argued that the author simply was the conduit of a language that 
already had its own meanings and structures before the author even started writing. 
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Marxist thinker Louis Althusser suggested that history was simply a process that people 
acted out – they were not in charge of it at an individual level.  
Michel Foucault’s work fitted into this general movement of thought. If we wish 
to describe his work in terms of its subject matter: his early work in the 1950s and 1960s 
fell within the general area of the history and philosophy of science and the history of 
ideas. In the 1970s, he focused more directly on the area of the history of the institutions 
and the State before going on to examine the history of ethical systems in the early 1980s. 
He also wrote about literature and art, historiography, current events and politics. The key 
word here is history. Foucault was as much a historian as a philosopher. He was 
interested in discerning patterns of order in historical systems of knowledge without 
resorting to vague organizing categories such as ‘genius’, ‘progress’, ‘rationality’, ‘cause’ 
and ‘effect’. These patterns of order were, he argued, quite specific to time and place and 
although they couldn’t be used to predict what might happen tomorrow, they were very 
useful for understanding the substrata on which our current societies rest and for opening 
up awareness concerning avenues for possible change. But we are perhaps veering off 
into abstractions here and this might be a good point to start looking at the actual concrete 
content of Foucault’s work. 
 
III  
Foucault published his first works in 1954 on psychology, but came to wider attention 
with the publication of his book Madness and Civilization in 1961. A full translation into 
English of this enormous 700 page volume was only just published this year in 2006. In 
this work Foucault traces the history of how madness has been dealt with in the Western 
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world from the thirteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth century. His history 
covers a broad sweep of disciplines, ranging from art and literature, to science, medicine 
and economics. He took a sympathetic view of the plight of those who were mad and 
argued that the modern scientific definition of madness as ‘mental illness’ was not 
necessarily an unambiguous advance in human history. If the book made little impact 
when it initially appeared, by the end of the 1960s sales had increased dramatically, 
particularly after the publication of Foucault’s bestseller The Order of Things in 1966, 
and the general growth of interest in marginal groups and experiences. A group of 
traditional psychiatrists organized an entire conference in 1969 in France to denounce the 
book and its less than flattering portrayal of the somewhat shady historical origins of 
psychiatry. The anti-psychiatry movement latched onto the book with the anti-
psychiatrist David Cooper providing the preface to the abridged English edition in 1967. 
If Foucault was sympathetic to the movement he emphasised that his work did not really 
fit comfortably within its boundaries. The difference lay in the fact that while the anti-
psychiatrists claimed that madness was the result of social exclusion, Foucault 
maintained that there was a concrete biological basis for forms of behaviour usually 
designated as indicative of madness or mental illness.  
This is an important point. One of the misconceptions concerning Foucault’s work 
is that he ignores concrete reality at the expense of so-called discourse. According to this 
misconception, things only acquire reality as the result of social practices or the way we 
talk about them. Foucault, contrary to this, holds that there is in fact an intractable 
physical reality – but the way we describe, interact with and focus on it is highly variable 
and by no means fixed. The only way we can apprehend this raw level is by means of a 
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whole panoply of complex cultural and conceptual tools which differ considerably 
according to historical period and culture. Foucault argues that the way we link words 
and things is by no means obvious, and that there is simply no way of pronouncing any of 
the links we make between words (or knowledge) and things to be absolutely true for 
once and for all. If this lack of certainty is a matter of despair for some – Foucault sees it 
as a reason to be optimistic. Ideas and practices which have oppressive and unjust effects 
on people and limiting effects within knowledge and science can always be changed. 
Whole sections of the population need not be condemned to a lifetime of misery in the 
name of some spurious truth – whether this be scientific, religious or political. Foucault 
notes: ‘It is one of my targets to show people that a lot of things that are a part of their 
landscape – that people think are universal – are the result of some very precise historical 
changes. All my analyses are against the idea of universal necessities in human 
existence’. [5]  
This is not an argument that there is no such thing as truth. Foucault states quite 
explicitly that he is not engaged in a ‘skeptical or relativistic refusal of all verified truth’. 
[6] What he is interested in doing is examining the historically and culturally specific 
rules which regulate how people are able to gain access to the truth and how truth is 
distributed throughout the social body. For example, one can look at who is authorized to 
speak the truth (priests, scientists, experts, journalists, therapists of all kinds). One can 
also analyse the methods which are recognized as valid in producing and organizing 
statements recognized as true (scientific research, historical research, therapeutic or 
religious introspection). Thirdly one can focus on institutions which are socially 
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authorized to distribute truth (schools, churches, political parties, colleges of experts, 
academic journals, the media and so on).  
This seems a timely point to introduce a notion indissolubly linked with 
Foucault’s name, that is power. Foucault defines power as the capacity of one structure of 
actions to modify another structure of actions. It is not something that can be owned and 
it has to be exercised to exist. In Foucault’s view, the production and deployment of truth 
is intrinsically linked with the exercise of power. The commonplace handed down from 
Plato is that power and truth are at opposite poles of the spectrum. But one has only to 
cast a cursory glance at the politics involved in research funding to counter this argument. 
Clearly, a well-funded medical researcher in a fashionable area such as cancer is going to 
be able to produce a lot more in the way of ‘truth’ than an unfunded researcher in a less 
glamorous area such as fybromyalgia. Foucault’s 1963 book The Birth of the Clinic 
makes this very point in relation to the development of modern clinical medicine in 
France from 1769 to 1825 relating the formation of medicine as a science to complex 
political, economic and social factors at the time. Foucault is careful to point out that the 
involvement of these factors does not invalidate the internal conceptual apparatus of 
science or other forms of systematized knowledge. In short, knowledge and science still 
remain operational in relation to the physical and external world. 
Foucault’s next book The Order of Things published in 1966 was an instant best 
seller. It was hailed as one of the manifestos of the new structuralist movement –even if 
most of the people who bought the book didn’t get beyond the first chapter and with good 
reason. This is probably Foucault’s most difficult and specialized book dealing with the 
history of economics, biology and linguistics. The press ignored the specialist content 
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however, and zeroed in on Foucault’s provocative statements that Marxism constituted a 
mere storm in a children’s paddling pool (OT: 262), and that the Man revered by 
humanism was dying if not already dead. These statements provided fertile fodder for 
controversy in both the structuralist and humanist camps.  
Two years after the publication of this book in 1968 student uprisings erupted 
around the world. Just as an aside here, with the increasing all pervasiveness of American 
culture, if until recently it was events in Paris in 1968 that have been held up as iconic – 
America is now jostling to occupy the whole stage as it attempts to do in so many other 
cultural and historical domains. Foucault was living in Tunisia at the time and was deeply 
affected by what happened to the students there – beatings, torture and years of 
imprisonment for merely distributing political tracts. He took risks himself – hiding a 
student printing press at home, an action which if discovered could have had serious 
consequences. He returned to France at the end of 1968 determined to take an activist and 
politically involved stance. In this he was not alone, 1968 marked the radical 
politicization of not only intellectuals, but students, workers and a variety of socially 
disadvantaged groups and ushered in a decade of general social unrest and contestation.  
During the 1970s Foucault was to be found at the forefront of both militant and 
intellectual activity promoting social justice. He attended demonstrations, chaired 
committees, signed numerous petitions and founded and was involved in groups which 
supported prisoners, health workers and immigrants as well as others. Interestingly, 
France did not develop any active left wing terrorist groups – a feature of the landscape 
elsewhere especially Germany and Italy in the 1970s. There were some suggestions at the 
time that it was the moderating influence of Foucault and other intellectuals which helped 
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contribute to this state of affairs in France. In 1975 in the wake of his activism in relation 
to conditions in prisons, Foucault published a history of the adoption of the prison from 
1757 to 1838 in France as a universal method of criminal punishment. The book was 
titled Discipline and Punish. This is arguably Foucault’s best known and most influential 
work. Using the example of the prison he traces the emergence of what he describes as a 
‘disciplinary society’, which involves the training of large populations of individuals to 
act in an easily manageable way. Institutions such as schools, prisons, military barracks, 
factories and hospitals all acted as conduits for this kind of training through the use of 
architecture, timetabling and the regimentation of physical activities and gestures. 
Compliance was guaranteed through complex systems of surveillance.  
In 1976 Foucault published the first volume of a History of Sexuality. This book 
argues that far from repressing sexuality modern European thought has done nothing but 
talk about it endlessly – proliferating scientific and institutional categories to deal with it. 
He also outlines ideas on how power is exercised and resisted in the social body and 
introduces the notion of ‘biopower’, an idea which has found considerable fortune in 
recent years in the works of commentators. By biopower Foucault means the 
management of births, deaths, reproduction and illnesses of the population by the modern 
State. In the late 1970s, Foucault also introduced his now widely used notion of 
‘governmentality’ which combines the words ‘government’ and ‘rationality’. He initially 
used the term to describe particular ways of administering populations in modern 
European history within the context of the rise of the idea of the State. He later expanded 
his definition to describe the techniques used to guide people’s everyday conduct and 
freedoms at every social level. This idea has been vastly popular and has generated a 
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huge industry applying the notion to the development of professions and the operation of 
bureaucracies worldwide.  
In the 1980s, Foucault turned his attention to the history of ethical systems in the 
West and examined the work of the Ancient Greek and Roman philosophers. Hitherto his 
historical period of choice had always been the 17th to the early 19th century in Europe. 
Again, this work has been widely influential, giving commentators historical tools to 
reflect on how human beings fashion themselves as entities able to make choices about 
how to act in relation to each other and their external environments. He published two 
further volumes of a History of Sexuality in 1984 a month before his death from AIDS. 
These volumes dealt with Ancient Greek and Roman attitudes towards sexuality and 
ethics as handed down in a number of philosophical texts. 
 
IV 
So what is one to conclude from all of this in the context of the kind of critiques that I 
outlined at the beginning of this paper? Why should Foucault’s work continue to be taken 
seriously? There is no doubt that Foucault’s work is difficult. He willingly admits that his 
writing style is somewhat convoluted, but there is also the fact that writing that 
challenges usual ways of organizing thought is going to require some effort on the part of 
the reader. Foucault was also writing for an educated, indeed a specialist audience and 
without this background some of his work is hard to access. Added to this, reading his 
work in English entails dealing with problems in the translation of both language and 
cultural assumptions. This complexity has led to misunderstandings and faulty 
characterizations of Foucault’s work. Foucault complained about this himself, 
 15
mentioning the reduction of his books to slogans and the fact that people often acquired 
their ideas about his work from the secondary literature rather than from the original 
texts. 
Questions about Foucault’s personal life and its relation to his work raise complex 
and long rehearsed questions about the relation between the author and his or her work 
and also about attitudes towards homosexuality in contemporary society. Many of the 
more scandalous allegations about his behaviour are not backed up by any evidence and it 
is unclear what implications they have in terms of the actual content of his work. 
Discrediting authors’ work by ad hominen arguments is a long-standing rhetorical device 
and of debatable merit. Artistic and intellectual production needs to rise and fall on its 
own terms and generally this is the historical test for any body of work.  
Why do people get so upset by Foucault’s approach and characterize him as 
having no regard for truth? The fact of the matter was that he was not prepared to just 
accept at face value what is conventionally offered up as truth. Neither was he prepared 
to ‘tell people what to do’, as the accepted model of how a philosopher should conduct 
him or herself often has it. His view was that many so-called truths which are accepted as 
self-evident have very precise historical origins and are often maintained in the interests 
of particular distributions of power within the social body. His work was about the 
careful historical examination and taking apart of these processes. From this a number of 
commentators have concluded that Foucault was out to destroy what all good thinking 
people know to be unquestionably true and that he was prepared to use any means 
possible – including inventing complete fictions - to achieve his ends. The fact that some 
of the more garbled applications of Foucault’s ideas sometimes veer closely towards this 
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position certainly does not help. But even a cursory examination of Foucault’s actual 
work simply does not bear this out. At a technical level his work is underpinned by a 
wealth of empirical research, with rigorous methods of historical archival investigation 
and analytical methods of comparison, verification and citation. Foucault was a familiar 
figure at the National Library in Paris and numbers of people have mentioned seeing him 
in the main reading room day in and day out. So why isn’t this enough to convince those 
who insist that he made it all up? One reason is that he deals with empirical material 
often ignored by others and arranges it in new and unexpected ways. Another reason is 
that he argues that this empirical material is already an interpretation, it has already been 
selected, and organized in particular ways. The idea that the ‘raw material’ of research is 
not neutral, which if not new is often conveniently ignored, also throws into question the 
efforts of other researchers and analysts, who thus find the foundations of their own work 
uncomfortably undermined.  
But one cannot draw the conclusion from this that Foucault is claiming that 
nothing is true and that what is designated as truth simply serves the interests of power 
and that attempts to guide the behaviour of others are always bad. What he is suggesting 
instead is that we just need to be very careful – too easy an acceptance of the status quo at 
either the level of knowledge or social organization can lead to the acceptance and 
perpetuation of myth, injustice and the restriction of reasonable freedoms within the 
social body. 
Foucault’s work has helped to free up ossified points of view and has provoked many to 
reassess their own ideas, to start debates and to use his work as a springboard for further 
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research in a wide range of disciplines. Foucault’s relentless challenges to the status quo 
are not an invitation to do away with all constraints. As he says: 
 
The important question here, it seems to me, is not whether a culture without 
restraints is possible or even desirable but whether the system of constraints in 
which a society functions leaves individuals the liberty to transform the system. 
Obviously, constraints of any kind are going to be intolerable to certain 
segments of society. The necrophiliac finds it intolerable that graves are not 
accessible to him. But a system of constraint becomes truly intolerable when the 
individuals who are affected by it don’t have the means of modifying it. [7] 
 
Foucault offers a fundamentally optimistic point of view. The present situation in 
any domain is not set in stone and is instead the product of a whole collection of actions 
and decisions undertaken by many people over a long period of time. This means things 
can be changed. Such optimism seems to be in short supply at present and is in my view a 
major reason to continue to read Foucault’s work. 
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